Out of the Home onto the Street: Foster Children Discharged into Independent Living by Maloney, Mari Brita
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 14 | Number 4 Article 5
1986
Out of the Home onto the Street: Foster Children
Discharged into Independent Living
Mari Brita Maloney
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mari Brita Maloney, Out of the Home onto the Street: Foster Children Discharged into Independent Living, 14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 971
(1986).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol14/iss4/5
OUT OF THE HOME ONTO THE STREET:
FOSTER CHILDREN DISCHARGED INTO
INDEPENDENT LIVING
1. Introduction
Reggie Brown, at age thirteen, entered the foster-care system.'
"Poor, black and in the system as a result of abuse at home, Reggie's
background was that of a typical foster-care child." 2 Upon his eigh-
teenth birthday,' he was discharged into "independent living"" and
"[a]ll he was given ... was cab fare and directions to the men's
shelter.'" When he arrived at the men's shelter he was told he was
"too young," 6 and his only other alternative was the street.
This scenario-foster children being discharged out of their homes
i. Rimer, From Foster Homes to Life on New York Streets: 3 Case Studies
in Failure, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at BI, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Rimer].
Children may be placed in foster care voluntarily by their parents, see N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 384(1)(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986); or by a court order issued
by a judge. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT §§ 1052, 1055 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986)
(abuse and neglect); id. art. 3 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986) (juvenile delinquency);
id. §§ 753, 754 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1986) (person in need of supervision). Foster
care has been defined to mean "all activities and functions provided relative to the
care of a child away from his home 24 hours per day in a foster family free home
or a duly certified or approved foster family boarding home or a duly certified group
home, agency boarding home, child care institution, health care facility or any com-
bination thereof." N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 427.2(a) (1976). For example, in
1985 in New York, "approximately 73% of the children in foster care resided in
foster homes, 12% in group homes, and 15% in institutions." REPORT BY NEW YORK
TASK FORCE ON PERMANENCY PLmNIo FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 6 (Feb. 1986)
(available at Fordham Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK TASK
FORCE REPORT].
2. Rimer, supra note 1, at B2, col. 1 (describing different circumstances of three
discharged foster children).
3. For a discussion of the ages at which foster children are discharged from
care in each state, see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
4. "Independent living" is a term used by foster care administrators to describe
the permanency goal of discharging foster children into their own responsibility upon
their discharge from the foster care system. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 430.12(f)
(1976). A foster child is discharged to "independent living" when it is not possible
for the child to be discharged to parents or for adoption. See id. § 430.12(f) (1976).
"The number of children assigned the goal of independent living is staggering-one
out of three in foster care in New York City alone." NEW YORK TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 68.
5. Rimer, supra note 1, at BI, col. 1.
6. Roberts, Court Ruling Hints at Broader Import, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985,
at B2, col. I (discussing impact of Palmer v. Cuomo on foster children).
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and onto the street-is replayed with intolerable frequency.7 A child
in the state foster care system reaches his or her eighteenth birthday,
and having reached the ceiling age at which he or she may remain
in the foster care system, the child is forced to leave his or her foster
home." The typical foster care statute mandates the expulsion of every
eighteen-year-old from foster care.9 Critically relevant factors, such
as emotional stability, maturity, and the ability to seek and maintain
gainful employment, are not evaluated before discharging the child
to "independent living."'" Thus, in most instances the states jettison
children into urban environments, where these children are unsuper-
vised, uneducated, and wholly incapable of leading a productive and
rewarding life." With alarming frequency the children become members
of the homeless society.' 2 Many turn to prostitution as a means to
survive. 'I Use of drugs and all its attendant problems are prevalent
among the homeless youth." A statutory system that does not re-
7. "Estimates are that more than one-half of the approximately 274,000 children
[nationwide] in foster care are teenagers and that the number being discharged at
the age of eighteen is increasing and could [in 19841 be as high as 130,000 annual-
ly." Demchak, Services Ordered for Homeless Youth, 6 YOUTH LAW NEWS 12, 13
(Sept.-Oct. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Homeless Youthl.
8. See, e.g., Rimer, supra note 1, at B1, col. 1.
9. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
10. See NEw YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
11. One example of such a foster child involves a mother who had to put her
twelve-year-old son into foster care because she was unable to care for him: "They
[social workers] told me they were going to help .... All those institutions and he
has no high school diploma. Harold was going to see a psychiatrist. He was commit-
ted to Bellevue .... What's he going to do? How is he going to take care of
himself?" Rimer, supra note 1, at B2, col. 1. For further examples of discharged
foster children who were ill-prepared for independent living, see Palmer v. Cuomo,
503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986), in which the court found that
"[sieven of the instant ten foster children were discharged, prior to reaching age
21, without adequate preparation for independent living." Id. at 21.
age 21, without adequate preparation for independent living." Id. at 21.
12. Robert M. Hayes, founder of The Coalition of the Homeless, has discovered
in his involvement with New York City's homeless that "[t]he foster-care system,
by failing the children, creates a whole new category of homeless people." Rimer,
New York Judge Curbs Discharge of Foster Youths With No Homes, N.Y. Times,
July 18, 1985, at B4, col. 3; see also infra note 259.
13. For a discussion of foster children turning to prostitution, see infra note 131
and accompanying text.
14. See The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and Related Proposals:
Hearings on H.R. 2810 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Income
Maintenance of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-12 (1985)
(testimony of Leonard Bradley, Deputy Commissioner, Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs.)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2810]; see also infra note 135 and accompany-
ing text.
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quire that the states make an informed individualized decision as to
whether to release a foster child, and that fails to provide for super-
vision of the foster child in the post-discharge period, is flawed."
Part II of this Note will survey the history of foster care in the
United States," the federal' 7 and state'" statutes, with their underly-
ing policies, and the constitutional law cases" that have defined the
parameters of the foster child's rights. Parts III, IV and V will discuss
the effectiveness of the current foster care system in protecting the
foster child's rights.20
The Note will examine various legal approaches utilized by plain-
tiffs in recent foster care cases, including: (1) private actions for
negligence;2' (2) class actions under Social Security statutes based on
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion and dealing specifically with equal protection22 and due pro-
cess;" and (3) civil rights actions brought under section 1983 of Title
42 of the United States Code. 2'
Finally, the Note proposes that, because of the national nature of
this problem, the federal government has an obligation to enact
legislation that will require the states: (1) to create transitional pro-
grams to teach foster children the necessary skills to live independent-
ly;26 and (2) to extend the age requirement for assistance from eighteen
to twenty-one so that the transitional program can have a positive
15. See NEW YO RK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I (describing overburdened
foster care system that leaves many 18-year-olds ill-prepared for independent living);
see also infra notes 36-86 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
17. See Infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
18. See Infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 123-235 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 142-97 and accompanying text.
23. See Infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 7.
26. See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying text. For an example of some ap-
propriate transitional programs, see N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 430.12(0(2) (1976),
in which New York requires that:
The district shall make plans and take specific actions to provide training
for the child in independent living skills such as apartment finding,
budgeting, shopping and cooking. In addition, the district shall make plans
and take specific actions to ensure training for the child directed toward
career objectives, such as training in a marketable skill or trade, counsel-
ing around career choices, and assistance in locating or enrolling in ap-
propriate programs.
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effect." The Note concludes that the Stark-Moynihan bill is the ap-
propriate legislation. "
1!. Bases for Foster Children's Rights
Foster children's rights are based primarily on four aspects of law:
common law,2 9 federal law,"0 state law," and constitutional law." These
four bases will be examined with the goal of constructing a framework
from which recent foster care cases can be understood."
A. Common Law
The earliest origins of a foster care system are found in "an an-
cient custom in Ireland, in which persons put away their children to
fosterers.' 4' The roots of the foster care system further developed
into an indenture system, "where orphans or children of the poor
were bound out to a household as a source of cheap labor. In the
early [nineteenth] century children were often sent to an almshouse;
by the middle of the century they were more often informally 'placed
out,' generally in rural areas, often out-of-state. By 1850; private
charitable institutions had been created to care for children.""
Foster children's legal rights developed from two different common
law doctrines: (1) adoption laws; 6 and (2) parens patriae.II Adoption
signifies the means by which a status or legal relationship of parent
and child, between persons who are not so related by nature, is
established or created.3" Adoption seeks to provide a child with a per-
27. See infra notes 242-59 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 237-86 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 142-216 and accompanying text.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979). It is ironic to note that in
the earliest stages of foster care "fostering was held to be a stronger alliance than
blood, and the foster children participated in the fortunes of their foster fathers,"
id., since today, strong bonds between a foster parent and foster child are a rare
occurrence because of the constant influx of foster children in and out of foster
homes. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at iii-iv, stating that
"[nearly 60% of the children in foster care in New York City have experienced
more than one placement, and about 28% have experienced three or more." Id.
35. NEW YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17..
36. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
38. Adoption is defined as a "[I]egal process pursuant to [a] state statute in which
a child's legal rights and duties toward his natural parents are terminated and similar
rights and duties toward his adoptive parents are substituted. To take into one's
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manent living arrangement, while foster care provides a temporary
arrangement.3 9 No right of adoption existed under the common law
of England. It is well documented, however, that the right of adopt-
ion was known in the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome."
In the United States,' 2 the right to create, by legal proceeding, the
relationship of parent and child between persons who are not related,
exists only by a statutory provision prescribing the conditions and
the procedure by which adoption may be made effective.'3
Foster care is also partly an offshoot of the state's power of parens
patriae," the traditional role of the state as sovereign and guardian
of persons under legal disability." This doctrine developed its roots
from the English common law, under which the King had a royal
prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities, such
as infants, idiots, and lunatics." The doctrine of parens patriae dic-
family the child of another and give him or her the rights, privileges, and duties
of a child and heir." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 45 (5th ed. 1979); see Sheffield v.
Franklin, 151 Ala. 492, 44 So. 373 (1906); Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d
388 (1952); Bilderback v. Clark, 106 Kan. 737, 189 P. 977 (1920); Martinez v.
Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
39. See supra note 3. Adoption is the goal of the foster care system, see Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1977)
(holding that New York foster care removal procedures provided due process protec-
tion), but since permanent, or long-term placements are more difficult to secure,
id. at 829 n.23, foster care programs try to provide short-term aid for children through
adequate accommodations, in addition to long-term placements. See id. at 825.
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (5th ed. 1979).
41. See In re Kirby's Estate, 145 Misc. 756, 758, 261 N.Y.S. 71, 72 (1932).
42. "A history of substitute care in America usually begins with a description
of apprenticeship and binding out of orphaned and abandoned children by the
early colonists, and passes through the orphanage and almshouse eras toward the
time when free foster family homes ... became the dominant mode of substitute
care." Kadushin, Child Welfare Strategy in the Coming Years: An Overview, in CHiD
WELFARE STRATEGY IN THE COBONO YEARS 54 (1978).
43. For a discussion of the origins of adoption, see In re Taggart's Estate, 190
Cal. 493, 213 P. 504 (1923); In re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537
(1937); Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E.2d 548 (1937).
44. The term parens patriae has been translated literally as "parent of the
country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). Furthermore, parens patriae
has been defined by the courts as the inherent power and authority of a state legislature
to provide protection for the person and property of persons non sui juris, such
as minors, insane persons and incompetent persons. See McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla.
1, 9, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922); cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922); see also Warner Bros.
Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), superseded, 31 Cal.
2d 766, 192 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1948). For a discussion of the
state's parens patriae power as it relates to "needy" persons, see Note, Homelessness
in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FoRDDAm URB. L.J. 749 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited
as Homelessness).
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note the
similarities between the policy underlying the parens patriae doctrine and another
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tates that a state must intervene to protect those who are unable to
protect themselves." The doctrine also embraces the situation in which
a person could become a danger to himself or others and therefore
is in need of protective custody." Thus, in the case of foster care,
when an unsupervised foster child could be a danger to himself or
to others, the state, under the penumbras of the parens patriae doc-
trine, becomes a legal parent to the foster child. ' 9
Since foster children were neither protected by the laws of adop-
tion nor specifically named under the parens patriae doctrine, Con-
gress was forced to create a statutory basis.5" It did so by expanding
the social welfare laws of the 1935 Social Security Act.5'
B. The Origins of Foster Children's Federal Rights
The Social Security Act of 1935 is the foundation of federal rights
for foster children." "The Social Security Act of 1935 was part of
a broad legislative program to counteract the [D]epression. Congress
was deeply concerned with the dire straits in which all needy children
in the Nation found themselves."" Congress' primary objective in
enacting section 402 of the Social Security Act, Aid to Dependent
Children, 4 was to provide support for children who did not have
a "breadwinner" to provide support." The original Aid to Depend-
doctrine with many identical goals: in loco parentis. Under the doctrine of in loco
parentis, "persons and institutions caring for children are said to occupy the legal
position of the children's parents, or at least to have a substantial portion of parents'
rights and immunities" regarding children. C. ROSE, SOME EMERGING ISSUES IN LEGAL
LIABIuTr OF CHmLDREN'S AGENCIES 5 (1978). Under both doctrines the state is presumed
to have a moral and legal obligation to care for its needy persons. Moreover, one
author noted that "[mleasures enacted under the parens patriae power are 'parental'
in nature rather than criminal and the penalties and stigma of criminal actions do
not attach." Homelessness, supra note 44, at 777-78.
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text; see also Johnson v. State,
18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1956).
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. Social Security Act, Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV § 401, 49 Stat.
627 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982)).
51. See generally id.
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327-28
(1968) (Court noted that "[iun agreement with the President's Committee on Economic
Security, the House Committee Report declared, 'the core of any social plan must
be the child.' ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935)).
53. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327 (1968); see H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9-10 (1935) (characterizing children as "the most tragic victims of the depres-
sion"); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 n.24 (1935) ("declaring that
the 'heart of any program for social security must be the child' ").
54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982).
55. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968) (Court stated that "AFDC pro-
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ent Children (ADC) focused totally on the needy child and did not
provide assistance to the family. 6
The ADC was amended in 1950 so that the payments would in-
clude assistance to the relative with whom any dependent child was
living." In 1962, the title of the program was changed from ADC to
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)." The new name
of the program was consistent with the new emphasis of the pro-
gram, namely, to provide assistance to a widowed and divorced mother
so that she would be released from a wage-earning role and could
remain at home to supervise the child's upbringing." Furthermore,
in 1961, the AFDC was amended to include foster children, changing
its previous policy of assisting only needy children who lived with
a parent or a close relative."
Under the AFDC program, the federal government provided match-
ing funds to the states so that the states would distribute these funds
to foster care recipients. These funds were available only if a child
met two eligibility requirements: (1) the child had to fall within the
section 606(a) definition of a dependent child;" and (2) the child had
to have been removed from his home as a result of a judicial deter-
gram was designed to protect ... [a] 'distinguishable group of children' .... [tihis
group was composed of children in families without a 'breadwinner,' 'wage earner,'
or 'father' ").
56. In Burns v. ALCALA, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that
"[a]s originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act made no provision for the
needs of the adult taking care of a 'dependent child.' It authorized aid only for
the child and offered none to support the mother." Id. at 581.
57. See Social Security Act Amendment of 1950, ch. 809, Pub. L. No. 734,
§ 323, 64 Stat. 551 (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982)).
58. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104, 76
Stat. 172, 185 (1962) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982)). For a discus-
sion of the corresponding legislative history, see 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1952-56.
59. See Burns, 420 U.S. at 582 (discussing President Roosevelt's message to Con-
gress advocating his support of the legislation).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1982); see also Burns, 420 U.S. at 582 n.9.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982). Section 606(a) defines a "dependent child" as:
[A] needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care
by reason of the death, continued absence from the home ... or physical
or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, step-
brother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place
of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their
own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the
option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time student
in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical
training), if, before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected
to complete the programs of such secondary school (or such training).
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mination. 62 Moreover, states were required to make foster care
payments as a part of their AFDC program. 63
In 1980, Congress further amended the Social Security Act by enact-
ing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Child
Welfare Act). 6 ' The Child Welfare Act created section 672, Federal
Payments for Adoption Assistance and Foster Care, that provided
to states separate foster care matching funds to distribute to foster
care recipients. These funds are distinct from the other AFDC pro-
grams. 6' For a foster child to be a recipient under section 672, the
child must meet four federal eligibility requirements. 66 First, the child
must fall within the definition of a dependent child under section
606(a). 67 Second, the child must be placed in foster care by either:
(1) a voluntary placement; or (2) a judicial determination.6 Third,
the child must be placed in a foster home or child-care institution."
And finally, such child's placement and care must be a state agency's
or a state-approved agency's responsibility."
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1982).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1982), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEWS 1451.
64. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
§§ 101-310, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Child Welfare Act). The goal
of the Child Welfare Act was to remove children from temporary foster care into a
more permanent adoption relationship. D. MoYNnHAN, FAM.Y AND NATION 49 (1986).
The Act tried to correct the tendency of foster parents to prefer continued foster
care to adoption for economic reasons. See id. Frequently, although a bond would
develop between a foster parent and child, the foster parent did not consider adopt-
ing the child because he or she would lose the foster care payments. See Id. To
remedy this problem, the Child Welfare Act provided that if low-income parents
adopted a child that had been placed with them under the Foster Care Program,
the federal government would allot funds to the states so that the states could make
regular monthly payments to supplement the foster parents' income. See id. The
Child Welfare Act "represented a small but significant attempt to rationalize the
welfare system. And it has worked. From 1977 to 1982, the number of children
in foster care declined from 502,000 to 274,000. And in 1984, some 12,000 children
received federally mandated adoption assistance." Id. at 49.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1982). The Child Welfare Act corrected some problems
in the foster care system. For a discussion of the impact of the Child Welfare Act,
see Morain, Making Foster Care Work, 4 CAL. LAW. 24 (1984) (addressing "foster
care drift," which occurs when children go from one temporary home to another;
failure of social service agencies to make adequate plans for individual children;
decisions to remove children from their homes based upon subjective rather than ob-
jective findings of social workers; lack of funding for programs to preserve or
reunite families).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1982).
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1982) (providing separate foster care federal funds
separate from AFDC federal funds).
69. See id.
70. See id.
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In sum, the Social Security Act and all of its subsequent amend-
ments provide adequate foster care services to many foster children."
Nevertheless, foster care services are not perfect, for, as discussed
below," a pressing need remains for an amendment that will provide
aid to older foster children."
C. Foster Children's Rights Under State Law
State participation in the federal AFDC program is voluntary, but
once the state chooses to participate, its AFDC plan must comply
with mandatory requirements of the Social Security Act." "One of
the statutory requirements is that 'aid to families with dependent
children ... shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligi-
ble individuals .... .' "" Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
"a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and
is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause."'16
The AFDC program, thus, is based on a "scheme of cooperative
federalism." It is financed largely by the Federal Government, on
a matching fund basis, and is administered by the States."7 " Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has stated that "States have considerable
latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each state is free
to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits
by the amount of funds it devotes to the program."7 9 In short, if
71. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 236-86 and accompanying text.
74. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972) (stating proposition that
states must comply with federal requirements in order to receive AFDC federal fund-
ing); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282. 286 (1971) (same proposition); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (same proposition); Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 408-09 (1970) (same proposition); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19
(1968) (same proposition).
75. King, 392 U.S. at 317.
76. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 286.
77. Cooperative federalism has been defined as "[tlhe distribution of power be-
tween national and local or state governments while each recognizes the powers of
the other." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 302 (5th ed. 1979).
78. King, 392 U.S. at 316. The formula for AFDC federal funding is codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982). The formula is complicated because the level of benefits
accorded to foster children is within the state's discretion but the federal govern-
ment's contribution to the states is a varying percentage of the total AFDC expen-
ditures within each state. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1982).
79. King, 392 U.S. at 318-19 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court, in Dand-
ridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), suggested that the reason why the federal
government allows the states a certain latitude in allocating their AFDC resources
is because "Congress was itself cognizant of the limitations on state resources from
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a state wishes to receive federal funds for its AFDC program, it must
comply with the federal requirements, otherwise it will forfeit its AFDC
funds."0
A survey of the fifty states shows that the states are not all complying with
federally prescribed guidelines on the age a foster child can be discharged ."
the very outset of the federal welfare program." Id. at 478. In Dandridge, the Court
explained that Congress had expressed its desire to grant states this latitude in
distributing AFDC funds by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), which provided that
each state should furnish financial assistance and services to its AFDC program "as
far as practicable under the conditions in such State ... ." Id.
80. For a discussion of how Arkansas lost its AFDC funds because it did not
follow the federal guidelines, see Glaze, Foster Care Reform: A Model for the Na-
tion, 20 ARK. LAW., Jan. 1986, at 27. The United States Children's Bureau, in its re-
view of Arkansas' AFDC program, found "that the state failed to provide a means of
monitoring the progress made on the child's behalf and determining whether the
child was receiving the services specified in his case plan." Id. at 30. As a result,
Arkansas had to repay the federal government $890,000, the amount in federal fund-
ing that Arkansas had previously received for its foster care program. See id. at 28.
81. The ages at which foster children are discharged from care range from age
sixteen to age twenty-one. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-7-2 (1977) (age 18); ALASKA
STAT. § 47.25.410 (1984) (age 18); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-501(B) (1986) (age
18, but under 21 if in high school or vocational school); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-1210
(1985) (age 18); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11253 (West 1986) (age 18, but 19
if still in high school or vocational school); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 26-6-102(4) (1973)(age 16); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 (West 1986) (age 18); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 31, § 301 (1974) (age 18); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-401 (1986) (age 18); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 743.07 (West 1986) (age 18); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-15 (1986) (age 18);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 577-1 (1976) (age 18); IDAHO CODE § 39-1209 (1985) (age 18);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (1985) (age 18, but under 21 if in high school or
vocational school); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-1-10-1 (Burns 1986) (age 18); IOWA CODE
§ 237.1 (1985) (age 18, but under 21 if in high school or vocational school); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 39-702 (1981) (age 18, but under 21 if in high school or vocational
school); Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.680 (1982) (age 18); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.231
(West 1982) (age 18, or 19 if in high school or vocational school); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4064 (1986) (age 18); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-525 (1984);
art. 1, § 24(2) (1981) (age 18); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 23 (West 1986)
(age 18, but under 21 if in high school or vocational school); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.111(K)(ii) (West 1986) (age 18); MIN. STAT. § 260.40 (1982) (age 21);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-17-3 (1986) (age 16, or 18 if in high school or vocational
school); Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.040 (1986) (age 18, or 19 if in high school or voca-
tional school); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103 (1985) (age 18); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-1901 (1984) (age 16); NEV. REV. STAT. § 424.010 (1985) (age 16); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-E-1 (1977) (age 18); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4C-2 (1986) (age 18);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7A-3 (1983) (age 18); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 430.12(0
(1976) (age 18); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-D-10.2 (1981) (age 18); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50-09-01 (1982) (age 21 if living in foster home); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01.1
(Page 1984) (age 18); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 402 (1987) (age 18); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 418.035 (1985) (age 18, but under 21 if in high school or vocational school); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2301(g) (Purdon 1968) (age 18); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
8, § 68 (1985) (age 18); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-12-1 (1984) (age 18); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 43-9 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (age 18); S.D. CODnFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-6.1 (1984)
(age 18, but under 21 if still in high school or vocational school); TENN. CODE ANN.
980
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Nebraska" and Nevada83 have foster care statutes that discharge the
foster child at sixteen. These provisions are inconsistent with section
606(a) of the Social Security Act." While Minnesota and North Dakota
are the only states that provide assistance to older foster children,8
at least fifteen other states have acknowledged the necessity of extend-
ing their foster-care statutes for as long as the child is in school or
in a vocational training program. 6 If other states follow Minnesota's
and North Dakota's example and amend their foster-care statutes
extending the age of assistance from age eighteen to twenty-one, as
a matter of common sense, it will cost them additional funds. 7 Never-
theless, by preparing foster children now for independent living and
assisting them until they are age twenty-one, states will save money
because they will not have to care for them in the future in other
§§ 37-2-401, 37-1-102(4A) (1986) (age 18, or 19 if in high school or vocational school);
TEX. HuM. RES. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1980) (age 18, but under 21 if in
high school or vocational school); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1 (1986) (age 18); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2752 (1985) (age 18); V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 34, § 104 (1985)
(age 18); VA. CODE § 63.1-195 (Supp. 1985) (age 18); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 74.15.020, 13.40.020(10) (1987) (age 18); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-2 (1986) (age 18);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (West 1979) (age 18); WYo. STAT. § 42-1-102 (1986) (age 18,
but under 21 if in high school or vocational school).
82. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1901 (Supp. 1984) (age 16).
83. NEV. REV. STAT. § 424.010 (1985) (age 16).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982).
85. MINN. STAT. § 260.40 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-09-01(4)(b) (1982). The
pertinent part of the Minnesota statute reads: "For purposes of any program for
foster children or children under state guardianship for which benefits are made
available on June 1, 1973, unless specifically provided therein, the age of majority
shall be twenty-one years of age." Id. The pertinent part of the North Dakota statute
states that a dependent child shall mean any child "[ujnder the age of twenty-one
years, who is living in a licensed foster home or in a licensed child-caring or child-
placing institution . . . ." Id.
86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-501(B) (1986); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11253
(West 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (1985); IOWA CODE § 237.1 (1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-702 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.231 (West 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 23 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. § 260.40 (1982); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 208.040 (1986); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 430.12(f) (1976); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-09-01 (1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.035 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-6-6.1 (1984); TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-20401, 37-1-102(4A) (1986);
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 42-1-102 (1986).
87. David Tobis, a child welfare specialist, noted that an additional three years
of assistance to foster children "could be used to train youths for jobs, help them
get housing and prepare them to live on their own, or it could merely increase the
number in foster care and postpone homelessness until they turn 21 .... The key
to the outcome is the priorities for the city and state." Roberts, Court Ruling Hints
at Broader Impact, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at B2, col. 3.
88. The Coalition of the Homeless (a non-profit New York organization that
assists the homeless of New York) estimated that extending foster care from age
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welfare programs, or in homeless shelters." Success stories are always
much cheaper for a government than are failures."
D. Constitutional Rights of Foster Children
In addition to statutory rights, constitutional rights protect foster
children.9" The United States Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood
eighteen to twenty-one would cost the State of New York at least an additional $70
million dollars just to begin implementing the programs. See Moses, Cost Cited in
Foster-Care Ruling, N.Y. Newsday, July 19, 1985, at 2NY. Currently, foster care
in New York City costs $335 million per year in city, state and federal funds.
See Rimer, New York Judge Curbs Discharge of Foster Youths With No Homes, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1985, at B4, col. I. Nevertheless, Mayor Koch has recognized the
importance of funding foster care: "I am willing to spend whatever is required within
our fiscal constraints to do that which is legal and, when the legal requirements
don't go far enough, that which is moral." Roberts, Court Ruling Hints at Broader
Impact, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985 at B2, col. 2.
89. For an example of a foster child success story, see Moses, Once Shut Out
by Age, Man Tastes a Victory, N.Y. Newsday, July 19, 1985, at 2NY. Joseph Morgan,
now twenty, was a foster child with no place to go when he was discharged at age
eighteen. Id. Today, Morgan is going to attend Marist College in Peekskill, N.Y.
and aspires to be a social worker. Id. He was one of the six plaintiffs who won
an extension in foster care assistance in Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985,
at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985), aff'd as modfied, 503 N.Y.S.2d
20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986) (Palmer case discussed infra notes 142-60 and
accompanying text). Although the City spent more money on Morgan originally,
it eventually will save money, because it will not have to care for Morgan in a homeless
shelter. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act: Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Income Maintenance of the Comm.
on Finance, United States Senate, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1986) (testimony of Dor-
cas Hardy, Chief of Health & Human Services' Office of Human Dev./Servs.)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329]. Even more important, Morgan
someday is likely to become a productive young man contributing to the general
welfare of society.
90. The two constitutional rights that are most frequently litigated in foster care
cases are equal protection, see infra notes 93-122 and accompanying text, and due
process. See infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
recognized that children have special constitutional rights. See Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in schools); Breed
v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1975) (fifth amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy precludes criminal prosecution of juvenile after juvenile court adjudication
involving the offense); see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 326 (1975)
(public high school students have substantive and procedural rights while at school,
and school board officials who "knowingly" or "unknowingly," violate student's
rights may be held liable for their actions); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)
(fourteenth amendment due process clause prohibits suspension of public school
students without notice and hearing); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (first amendment protects students' right to wear
armbands as passive protest against United States policy in Vietnam); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 49 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies
in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962)
(due process provides special protection to juveniles in formal confessions).
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v. Danforth,9' held that age is not the sole prerequisite of constitu-
tional guarantees, for "[clonstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights." 9
To discuss all of a foster child's constitutional rights would be
beyond the scope of this Note. This Note will focus primarily on
the right of equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment93 because it is the constitutional right that is most fre-
A few cases, however, suggest that aid to foster children through the foster care
system is not constitutionally protected. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 15-18 (1981) (Court stated that no type of welfare benefits
is guaranteed by Constitution); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975)
(Court similarly stated that there is no constitutional right to treatment of the needy
at public expense); see also McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434, 440-41 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding state requirement to disclose social security account number in order
to receive AFDC benefits did not violate constitutional "right to privacy" because
"[wielfare benefits are not a fundamental right"); Murrow v. Clifford, 404 F. Supp.
999, 1001 (D.N.J. 1975) (court held that there is no fundamental right to aid families
with dependent children).
91. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (striking down state law requiring minors to obtain
parental consent as prerequisite to obtaining abortions, because the law effectively
would give parents an absolute veto over minors' decisions).
92. Id. at 74. The Danforth case is relevant when considering the issue of whether
foster children should be denied assistance at age eighteen, regardless of their ability
to live productive lives, for in both instances, issues of a child's maturity arise. See
id. at 74-75. In Danforth, the Court held that there must be a state procedure to
an individualized determination of whether a minor might be sufficiently mature or
emancipated to make the decision to undergo an abortion herself. Id. at 74-75. Thus,
the Court recognized the great importance of an individualized determination of a
child's ability to make an adult decision. See id. The Court refused to be held to
an arbitrary age limit. See id. This same rationale can be applied in the case of
discharging foster children. An individual analysis of each child's maturity and capabili-
ty to live independently should be conducted before a foster child is discharged.
The Court in Danforth indicated that a parent's consent, even if the "parent" is
deemed to be the state, as in the case of foster children, cannot override a child's
constitutional rights when the child's well-being is at stake. Id. at 74-75.
93. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I. The fourteenth amendment, in the relevant part,
reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. The general concept
of equal protection implies that all persons shall be treated alike under similar circum-
stances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and in liabilities imposed. See
generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNo, CONsTITuTIONAL LAW 521-801 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as ROTUNDA); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1136
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. See also Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins.
Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937) (stating statutory discrimination between mutual
companies and stock companies which write insurance in the state violated equal
protection clause); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
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quently contested in actions brought by foster children.9" A connect-
ing thread in the different cases that have been brought under an
equal protection theory is that some foster children have been treated
differently than other foster children and other children who receive
federal assistance." One example of this unequal treatment that plain-
tiffs have offered is the fact that some foster children are given after-
care services while others are given "cab fare" and the address of
a homeless shelter. 6 Paradoxically, the foster children who need the
most after-care assistance are frequently the ones most neglected. 97
This paradox, in which the more severely handicapped are allotted
U.S. 183 (1936) (holding no violation of equal protection because statutory classifica-
tion was reasonable).
94. See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
95. See id.
96. A recent New York Times article compares three foster children who were
given very different after-care services upon their discharge. See Rimer, supra note
1, at I, col. 1. Reggie Brown was discharged on his 18th birthday and was given
cab fare and directions to a men's shelter. See id. Harold Fredericks was discharged
to a Job Corps training program, and Joseph Morgan was given $500 and discharged
to independent living. See id. The obvious difference between one child receiving
a $5 cab fare and another $500 and a job, illustrates the discrepancy in foster care
services and shows that foster children are not given equal attention and care by
the foster care system. See id.
Moreover, Mark Hardin, the director of the Foster Care Project of the National
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, American Bar Associa-
tion, stated: "Services are generally unevenly distributed within many States, and
a particular type of service may run out in midyear because of inadequate budgeting.
Further, no clear agency policy generally exists defining what services are available
and under what conditions." Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act: Hearings
on S. 1266, S. 1329 Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Income Maintenance
Programs of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1985)
(testimony of Mark Hardin, director, Foster Care Project, National Legal Resource
Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, American Bar Association).
97. In many instances, it appears that the different levels of assistance to foster
children is frequently based on how cooperative they are with their supervisors. Cf.
NEW YORK TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I, at 47. Often the "problem children"
are the most neglected by the foster care system because they are simply wrenches
in the foster care machine, that cause the system to run inefficiently. See id. A com-
parison of Reggie Brown, a foster child who is now in prison after being arrested
for burglary and Joseph Morgan, a foster child who is attending Marist College
in Poughkeepsie, New York, demonstrates that the foster care system in New York
State gives up on the difficult cases and focuses more on helping the possible success
stories. See Rimer, supra note 1, at BI, col. 1. Reggie Brown was shuttled
from in and out of foster homes because he had problems following rules. See id.
at B2. He was eventually discharged after violating a curfew. See id. Joseph Morgan,
on the other hand, had a stable home with foster parents from infancy to age fif-
teen. See id. Morgan entered the Job Corps when he was discharged from the foster
care system and received his high school equivalency certificate. See id.
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less assistance than others in the same class, has been held to violate
the equal protection clause."8
Courts analyzing foster children's rights under equal protection
claims have adopted a case-by-case approach." This approach is in
accordance with the Supreme Court's policy that when analyzing equal
protection violations, no one standard will suffice, and that each case
must be decided as it arises. °0  In each case, the court must determine
if the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.' 0 ' Furthermore,
the classification must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly situated are treated alike.'
0 2
98. In Klosterman v. Cuomo, 126 Misc. 2d 247, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) the New York Supreme Court recognized an equal protection
violation and granted assistance to the plaintiffs based solely on their need. The
plaintiffs in this case had been treated in a state psychiatric hospital and discharged
as part of the state's policy to release patients to less restrictive, community-based
residences. See id. at 251, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 584. Each plaintiff became homeless,
and efforts to receive assistance from state and municipal agencies were unavailing
or, at best, resulted in only minimal periodic assistance. See id.
The plaintiffs asserted a denial of equal protection under the law pursuant to
the fourteenth amendment, because other patients similarly situated were provided
with the services upon release that the plaintiffs were denied. See id. The plaintiffs
provided evidence that by virtue of the greater severity of their illnesses they were
denied treatment whereas other patients were provided appropriate care and supervi-
sion. See id. The Supreme Court sustained the action allowing the plaintiffs to establish
that governmental officials were not satisfying nondiscretionary obligations to per-
form certain functions. See id.
This paradox, in which the more severely handicapped are allotted, for that reason,
less assistance than are others in the same class, has similarly been held violative
of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d
247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977) (holding statute unconstitutional which discriminated
against aged, disabled and blind), In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432,
335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972) (finding statute unconstitutional that discriminated against
females without any rationale for age/sex distinction).
99. See infra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
100. See Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293, 296 (1898)
(holding consitutional classification under Illinois inheritance tax law).
101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102. For a complete discussion of equal protection standards of review, see
ROTUNDA, supra note 93, at 523-801; TRIBE, supra note 93, at 991-1136. An equal
protection analysis requires "strict scrutiny" of legislative classifications when the
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. See ROTUNDA, supra note
93, at 530-31. Suspect classes have been held to include race or national origin, see
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), or gender. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977). Courts, however, have not held that age is the basis for a suspect
classification. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(upholding state statute mandating retirement at age fifty for state uniformed police
as rationally related to legitimate state interest). Accordingly, courts will not apply
a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing claims of age-based classifications. See
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The "rationally related" standard of judicial review'03 typically ap-
plied in foster children's equal protection claims has been characterized
as a pro-state test because it presumes that the classification under
attack is constitutional.'"" Consequently, many of the foster child
litigants who have brought claims under an equal protection theory
have been unsuccessful. In Dandridge v. Williams,101 the appellees,
large-family recipients of benefits under the AFDC program, brought
an action to enjoin the application of Maryland's maximum grants
regulation, which was a ceiling of about $250 per month that was
imposed as an AFDC grant regardless of the size of the family and
its actual need.'10 The Court held that this state regulation did not
violate the equal protection clause.' 7 The Court, however, also held
that in allocating funds available for AFDC payments, a state may
not "impose a regime of invidious discrimination" in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 8
Foster children frequently litigate unsuccessful equal protection claims
based on age classifications.'10 In McClellan v. Shapiro,"10 a class ac-
tion was brought by a nineteen-year-old AFDC recipient.I" McClellan's
welfare benefits were terminated by an amendment to the Connec-
ticut State Welfare Statute which defined a "dependent child" as one
under the age of nineteen or who had attained the age of nineteen
while in full-time attendance in a secondary school." 2 The court held
ROTUNDA, supra note 93, at 537-38. Furthermore, courts will not utilize a strict scrutiny
standard of review carries a presumption of constitutionality, for it reflects the courts'
welfare. See id. at 524. Thus, for both of these reasons, courts do not apply a stan-
dard of strict scrutiny when reviewing foster children's equal protection claims based
on age classification. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
Instead, courts apply a standard in which the classification need only be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See id. at 530. The rationally related
standard of review carries a presumption of constitutionality, for it reflects the courts'
awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions, is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one. See e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977)
(holding statute unconstitutional which allowed illegitimate children to inherit by in-
testacy from their mothers, not from their fathers); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420. 425 (1961) (upholding statutory prohibition of selected activities on Sundays
as rationally related to legitimate governmental interest).
103. For a complete discussion of the nature and application of the rational basis
standard of review, see ROTUNDA, supra note 93, at 530; TRIBE, supra note 93, at 994.
104. See id.
105. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
106. See id. at 473-75.
107. See id. at 473-87.
108. See id. at 483.
109. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
110. 315 F. Supp. 484 (D. Conn. 1970).
Ill. See id.
112. See id.
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that the classification created by the statutory amendment was
"rationally related"' 3 to the state's proper purpose of encouraging
dependent citizens to become self-supporting. '
4
Another case that similarly focused on the arbitrary nature of an
age classification was Ramirez v. Weinberger."' In this case, a mother
brought an action seeking student benefits under the AFDC program.
The benefits were terminated when her son reached the age of twenty-
one. She asserted that the state and federal AFDC statutes requiring
the termination of student benefits at age twenty-one denied twenty-
one-year-old students equal protection." 6 She argued that similar-
ly situated students who were qualified to claim benefits under the
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance"' title to the
Social Security Act could claim such benefits until age twenty-two.",
The court held that the legislative distinctions "comport[ed] with
the constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process
of law.""" Dismissing the case, the court stated that despite certain
similarities between the two tides of the Act, their separate and distinct
funding methods, eligibility standards, and administration demonstrated
that the two programs also differed in many substantive respects.' 0
The court thus concluded that the distinct and separate nature of each
program adequately justified the challenged age distinction in benefit
termination points.' 2'
In sum, foster children's equal protection claims have not been suc-
cessful because courts consistently find that additional, state-imposed
requirements, which must be met for foster children to qualify for
AFDC funding, are "rationally related" to the governing state
statutes."' Hence, in order for foster children to bring successful
113. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
114. McClellan v. Shapiro, 315 F. Supp. 484 (D. Conn. 1970).
115. 363 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
116. Id. In Ramirez, the court emphasized the important point that state and federal
statutes that terminate assistance to dependent children discriminate against them
because of age, and because they are not students. See id. The Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 606-676 (1982), and many state statutes extend the age ceiling of
assistance to foster children if they are in school or enrolled in a vocational training
program. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. This requirement appears to
violate the equal protection guarantees of those older foster children who either choose
not to continue their education, or are not academically inclined. See supra notes
108-21 and accompanying text.
117. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-433 (1982).
118. Ramirez, 363 F. Supp. at 108.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 109-10.
121. See id.
122. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
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equal protection claims in the future, foster children must show that
state requirements which limit assistance to foster children are arbitrary
and cannot be "rationally related" to the true purpose of foster
care statutes-to aid needy children.
II. The Current Problem: Homeless Foster Children
Available statistics do not accurately measure the number of children
who are discharged into "independent living" and become homeless.'"
Once they graduate from foster care, the children usually have no fur-
ther contact with the agency that had been responsible for their wel-
fare. "' Thus, the absence of contact with the appropriate regulatory
agencies precludes the compilation of accurate records that reflect the
housing and living situations experienced by recently graduated foster
children.'" Nevertheless, it is safe to state that these graduates en-
counter the same problems in securing an apartment that all young
urban dwellers experience. 16 In point of fact, the graduates are unable
to place a security deposit on an apartment;' 27 nor can they afford
to pay rent.' 2 ' Consequently, if the individual is unable to live with
friends or relatives, the street or city shelters are the only alternative."'
Street life results in tragic stories.'"0 "The Inspector General reports
that [twenty-five percent] of the homeless youth engage in illegal activ-
ity: 100,000 boys and girls annually turn to prostitution for survival."''
In a 1985 Child Welfare League of America survey," 2 state officials
123. See Homeless Youth, supra note 7, at 13.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and Related Proposals:
Hearings on H.R. 2810 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Income
Maintenance of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-6 (1985)
(testimony of Helen Stone, Director of the Institute for Quality Child Welfare Servs.)
[hereinafter cited as Stone, Hearings on H.R. 2810].
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Weber. Home Sweet Home, 6 YouTH LAw Naws 14-15 (Sept.-Oct. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Sweet Home]. See also Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y. L.J., July 25,
1985, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985), in which Justice Wilks noted that
"[i]t is well documented and recognized even with the city agency itself, that the
Men's Shelter and its satellites are overcrowded, often dangerous, and 'an inap-
propriate setting' for young adults." Id.
130. For a discussion of the perils of street life experienced daily by three foster
children who lived on the streets, see Rimer, supra note 1, at BI, col. 1.
131. See Sweet Home, supra note 129, at 15.
132. See The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and Related Proposals:
Hearings on H.R. 2810 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Income
Maintenance of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1985)
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described what they believed happened to children eighteen and over
who must leave foster care because of the lack of a federal or state
subsidy and without adequate preparation for independence. The results
showed that, nationwide, foster children have failed to learn the
necessary tools that enable a child to make the transition from foster
care into independent living and, consequently, are unable to live
productive lives.'
Foster care children are ending up homeless because they have been
discharged prematurely."' Challenges of an adult world-securing gain-
ful employment, housing, acting appropriately in the social sphere,
narcotics, alcohol, and premarital sex-present a serious threat to the
health and welfare of these graduate foster children because they
are unprepared to deal with such challenges."' In short, these children
require a stable, supportive environment in which they can make the
transition to adult society-the street is not this type of environment.
IV. Current Litigation Strategies
There is little evidence that any of the foster care statutory reforms
of the past five years have improved foster children's lives." 6
Hence, plaintiffs have sought to vindicate the rights (common
law, federal, state, and constitutional) of the foster child in the courts.1 37
(testimony of Leonard Bradley, Deputy Commissioner Tennessee Dep't of Human
Servs.) [hereinafter cited as Bradley, Hearings on H.R. 2810]. The Child Welfare
League of America conducted a state-by-state survey to record the available services
offered to foster children upon their being discharged to make the transition into
independent living easier. See id. The state agencies in charge of the foster care system
in each state were asked to describe what they believed happened to children who
are eighteen years of age and who must leave foster care. See id.
133. See Bradley, Hearings on H.R. 2810, supra note 132, at 1-2 and accompany-
ing text. The results of the survey illuminated the depth of this tragic situation: "From
Iowa: [reports indicated that] [slome exist on marginal jobs; others move in with
others; some girls move into prostitution." Id. at 5. The Department of Social Ser-
vices in Tennessee reported that "[foster children] do not complete their education,
[they] become involved in the criminal justice system, [they] become pregnant at an
early age (usually out-of-wedlock) and [they] do not find gainful employment." Id.
California officials noted that "[either they live on their own, [or] enter the mental
health system which provides half-way houses, or they disappear from sight." Id.
Finally, in Illinois it was reported that "many become 'street kids.' They have a
difficult time establishing independence and frequently join the service or apply for
public assistance." Id.
134. See Stone, Hearings on H.R. 2810, supra note 123, at 6.
135. Cf. id. at 3.
136. See Rimer, New York Judge Curbs Discharge of Foster Youths With No
Homes, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1985, at B4, col. 6; see also supra notes 123-35 and
accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 142-216 and accompanying text.
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Foster care plaintiffs currently utilize three principal litigation strategies:
(1) class actions based upon alleged statutory violations under federal
and state Social Security statutes;'"8 (2) section 1983 actions based
upon alleged violations of federal Social Security rights;' 3 and (3)
private common law actions based upon alleged negligence and tort
violations." 0 This Section will analyze these strategies and the legal
theories advanced in the actions. Part V will then describe how
these approaches are inadequate in protecting the rights of foster
children."'
A. Class Actions Under Social Security Statutes
The most common type of foster care litigation today is the class
action." 2 The class that has been the most successful in protect-
ing foster children's rights is the class in Palmer v. Cuomo."" In
138. See infra notes 142-97 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 217-35 and accompanying text.
142. Class actions are a "means for vindicating the legal rights of large groups
of litigants." See J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 510 (1981). Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiffs must further meet the requirements of at least one
of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Id.
Under Rule 23(b)(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Rule 23(b)(2) reads as follows: "the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole .... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Rule 23(b)(3) reads as follows: "the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
143. Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
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Palmer v. Cuomo,'" the plaintiffs were six foster care recipients be-
tween the ages of eighteen and twenty-one who had been discharged
from their foster care placements to "independent living,"' 4' and three
recipients currently placed in foster care group homes who expected
to be discharged in the near future.4 , 6 The plaintiffs sought to obtain
a preliminary injunction, in order to prevent defendants from: (1)
failing or refusing to supervise these discharged plaintiffs; and (2)
removing the plaintiffs from their placements until the defendants
prepared individual discharge plans for the plaintiffs in accordance
with the New York Social Services Law and state regulations.1"
The defendants argued that providing additional services to children
who have been discharged from foster care would "burden the agency
financially, jeopardizing its ability to properly care for the children
presently in foster care."" 8 Justice Elliot J. Wilk, New York Supreme
Court, Special Term, did not agree with the defendants' economic
rationale, and instead, the court ruled that by state law, foster care
agencies "must prepare the child for independent living by providing
training in skills such as apartment finding, budgeting, shopping, and
cooking. Finally, the child must receive career counseling and train-
ing in a marketable skill or trade."" 9 Moreover, the court stated that
"[slaving money is not a proper justification for the denial of assistance
to the needy,""10 a ruling for which there is substantial Supreme Court
precedent. " ',
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and held that New York State and City Social Service officials
had failed to discharge their duties under state law to supervise youth
144. See Palmer, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
145. See id. For a discussion of independent living, see supra note 4 and accom-
panying text.
146. See Palmer, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
147. See id. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; and (3) a favorable balanc-
ing of the equities. See D. Donas, REMEDIES 108-09 (1973).
148. Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
149. See Palmer, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3.
150. Id. at 6, col. 4.
151. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that absent
compelling justification, family could not be denied welfare aid constituting basis
for family members' ability to obtain means of survival solely because family was
member of class that could not satisfy one-year residency requirement); see also Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Court held that saving of welfare costs cannot justify
an otherwise invidious class classification); Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d
247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977) (saving of money not proper justification for denial
of assistance to the needy).
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in foster care until they reach the age of twenty-one and to prepare
these youths to live independently.' Justice Wilk stated in his opin-
ion that all of the three requirements' for a preliminary injunction
had been met by the plaintiffs,'5 and concluded that the "balance
of equities"'" clearly lay with the plaintiffs, especially "[c]onsidering
the current circumstances of the plaintiffs, their lack of resources and
alternatives.""'5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court, Special Term, held
that New York City and other municipalities are obligated to provide
supervision under the foster care program for young persons through
age twenty-one.' 5
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the Special Term's
major finding that attending to the needs of foster children and
"reasonably preparing" them after they left foster care was a govern-
mental obligation."' Nevertheless, it did modify the lower court's
holding that the City and State Social Service Agencies were jointly
responsible: "We modify only to the extent of enjoining the City to
perform its pre-discharge preparatory obligations and its post-discharge
supervisory responsibilities, and directing the State to promulgate
regulations governing the statutory obligation to supervise.""
Although Palmer v. Cuomo primarily involved a consideration of the
152. See Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
154. See Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
Justice Wilk stated that the necessary requirements for a preliminary injunction had
been met by the plaintiffs:,
Not only have they [plaintiffs] demonstrated a likelihood of success by
dramatizing defendants' failure to comply with applicable provisions of
the (SSL) and the regulations, but they have ably documented the conse-
quences of defendants' actions on their lives. Homelessness itself constitutes
irreparable injury.
Id. (citing Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1980), modified on other
grounds, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Bryant Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. Koch,
N.Y.L.J., Apr., 1985, at 14, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985); Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup, Ct. N.Y. 'County 1976).
155. In balancing equities, a court usually considers the benefits and costs of adopt-
ing both the plaintiff's and the defendant's positions. See D. DOBS, REmEDMS 55-56,
108 (1973). A court will also weigh the consequences that each potential outcome
will have on society. See id. The claimant with the most positive combination of
factors will often be the winning party. See id.
156. Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
157. See id.
158. See Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
159. Id. at 22.
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New York State Social Services Law,' 60 the case is not unrelated to
other cases brought throughout the United States on behalf of foster
children. " I'
Another case that illustrates the complexity of foster care litiga-
tion is G.L. v. Zumwalt."I In Zumwait, the plaintiffs brought a class
action against the Missouri Division of Family Services, on behalf
of the children in foster care in the Kansas City, Missouri area."13
The plaintiffs argued that their rights to be protected from harm,
secured by the United States Constitution and by Title IV of the Social
Security Act, had been violated by the practices and policies of the
defendants." 4 The district court approved a consent decree"5 pro-
viding for, inter alia, licensing of foster homes,'6 mandatory training
of foster parents,"6' proper matching of foster children with foster
parents," 6 prohibition on the use of improper punishment of foster
children,' investigation of and response to suspected incidents of
abuse and neglect or unsuitable care,7 0 elimination of overcrowding,"'
rate of reimbursement, and caseload size.' 2 The plaintiffs' claims for
damages in this case were dismissed by consent of the parties.' The
consent decree set forth in Zumwalt became a guideline for later courts
to follow.",
One court that followed the court's example in Zumwalt was
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in
160. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 20(3), 398(6)(h) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y.
ADhMN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 430.12(f), 430.13 (1976).
161. The plaintiffs in Palmer asserted many claims not discussed in this section
of the Note, such as the violation of constitutional rights based upon the fifth and
fourteenth amendments' guarantee of equal protection and due process, and the
deprivation of plaintiff's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since these
claims were not ruled on by the New York Supreme Court, nor by the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, they will be discussed in later sections of this
Note. See supra notes 93-122 and accompanying text, infra- notes 179-87, 198-208
and accompanying text.
162. 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. A consent decree is a stipulation between the parties, subject to approval
by court, that the parties' final agreement will constitute the final judgment. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 370 (5th ed. 1979).
166. See G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
167. See id. at 1033.
168. See id. at 1033-34.
169. See id. at 1035.
170. See id. at 1035-36.
171. See id. at 1036.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1043.
174. See, e.g., Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (Ist Cir. 1983); Joseph A. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1982).
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Joseph A. v. New Mexico Department of Human Services. " ' The
plaintiffs, children currently in the custody of the New Mexico Depart-
ment of Human Services, alleged that there was no procedure for
development of a permanent plan for the transition of the children
to permanent homes.'76 The defendant, the Department of Human
Services, moved to dismiss the action, arguing that: (1) "there [was]
no constitutional or statutory right to a permanent, stable, adoptive
home"; and (2) the eleventh amendment barred the claims for
damages.'
On September 23, 1983, the court approved a consent decree in
a state-wide class action that sought to establish that foster children
have a right to a permanent, stable home.' 8 A significant point that
Judge Burciaga considered was whether foster children might have
a constitutionally protected due process' right based upon property
interests arising from their entitlements under the federal statutes, such
as the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.80* The
court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a wide variety
of property interests that are within the safeguards of due process.' 8'
Property interests, the court stated, "are not created by the Constitu-
tion, but rather 'are defined by existing rules or understandings that
175. 575 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1982).
176. See id. at 349.
177. See id. at 350.
178. See id. at 354-55.
179. The constitutional guarantee of due process is protected by relevant clauses
in both the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The
fifth amendment states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or pro-
perty, without due process of law," U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, and the fourteenth amend-
ment states: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
The due process protection applies to children as well as adults. See, e.g., McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). Indeed, Justice
Douglas, in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), stated that "Ineither man nor
child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional re-
quirements of due process of law." Id. at 601. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952), the Court explained that the purpose underlying the principle of due
process originated to prevent the denial of fundamental fairness that "shocks the
conscience ... and offend a 'sense of justice.' " Id. at 172-73.
180. See Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 351; see also supra notes 79-88 and accompa-
nying text.
181. See 575 F. Supp. at 351; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564(1972) (holding that public employment may not be denied without due process when
a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement to such employment); cf Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's continued employment at state university pur-
suant to implied tenure is not protected by due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (government may not deprive person of certain government benefits
which have been accorded by law, without granting due process).
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stem from an independent source such as state-laws, rules, or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits.' "I" The court did not ultimately de-
cide if the plaintiffs had successfully met their burden of showing that
their property interest had been violated, but ruled that the court must
allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove this entitlement.' 3
Furthermore, the court noted that a violation of due process may
also be analyzed as a denial of a "liberty interest."'" As long as the
foster children's liberty interests were created by a specific state or fed-
eral law, or the interests had been found to be implicit in the Constitu-
tion because they were "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men,""'8 then they would have a successful due process ac-
182. Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 351 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). In Roth, the Court noted that "[t]o have a property interest
in a benefit-, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it." Id. at 577. Moreover, the Court in Roth found no independent source of a
property interest, such as past custom, as there was in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 602-03 (1972) (requiring officials to grant respondent's request for a hearing
explaining why he was not granted tenure). Id. at 578 n.16.
A past custom does exist in the case of older foster children, and thus supports
a claim of a due process violation based upon property interests. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 606 (1982). In fact, before the 1981 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 606, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 2311, the past custom was to aid foster children until age twenty-one. See 42
U.S.C. § 606, Pub. L. No. 88-641 (1964 amend.). Older foster children have more
than an abstract need, and in fact, have a property interest. See 575 F. Supp. at 351.
183. See Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 351.
184. See id. at 351-52. The Supreme Court has defined "liberty" and "property"
within the meaning of the due process guarantee as "broad and majestic terms ...
'purposely left to gather meaning from experience.' " Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S.
582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Moreover, the Court has said that a "liberty interest":
[D]enotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
an ... individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ...
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This all-encompassing definition of
a liberty interest appears to include older foster children who were discharged into
independent living: these children are prevented from establishing a home and engaging
in common occupations in life, because they have not had adequate preparation by
the foster care system. Thus, older foster children have been denied their basic liberty
interests. Cf. notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
185. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (due process protects parents' liberty
interest to have their child speak a foreign language). For a discussion of other types
of constitutionally protected liberty interests, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(due process protects student's liberty interest in public education); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (due process protects person's liberty interest in repu-
tation).
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tion.' 6 The court emphasized this point by noting that "[imn a Con-
stitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning
of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."' 7
In Joseph A., the court examined additional constitutional
arguments.' 8 The plaintiffs claimed that they had an inherent con-
stitutional liberty interest in a permanent, stable adoptive home.' 8 9
The court held that "there is no case law even suggesting that these
children are somehow entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to
enjoy the benefits of a foster or adoptive family."' 90 The court based
its conclusion on the fact that this case is not the type of case in
which the court is intruding into the sphere of family integrity"' that
the Constitution has been held to protect." 2 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs could obtain injunctive and declaratory relief for
violations of Titles IV and XX of the Social Security Act,"93 and the
plaintiffs could recover monetary relief for the denial of rights under
section 1983." 9" The court noted, however, that under the eleventh
amendment,' both the Department and the individual defendants in
their official capacities were immune from a suit for damages. 96
In short, the consent decree issued in Joseph A. set forth a detailed
scheme that restructured the foster care sytem in New Mexico.'" Joseph
186. See Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 352.
187. Id. at 351 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)).
188. See infra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
189. See 575 F. Supp. at 351-52.
190. Id. at 352.
191. Id. Traditionally, courts have tried to remain distant from domestic matters.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Family integrity refers to parents'
right to raise and discipline their children as they see fit. See e.g., Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Courts usually will not interfere unless it is in the "best interests of the child." See
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 908 (5th
ed. 1984). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized a "private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter" without compelling justification. See Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (guardian was denied the right to direct
her ward to distribute religious literature in violation of state law forbidding child
labor). For a complete discussion of family privacy, see ROTUNDA, supra note 93,
at 684-94; TRINE, supra note 93, at 985-90.
192. See Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 351-62. But cf. Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding New York
State's procedure for removal of children from foster homes did not violate due
process); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1922) (state sought to abridge parental
rights in controlling child's upbringing).
193. See Joseph A., 575; F. Supp. at 353.
194. See id.
195., See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
196. See 575 F. Supp. at 353; infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
197. The consent decree in Joseph A. included the following requirements:
1. permanent plans must be developed for foster children within six months
after the child enters care;
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A. is thus a significant case in the field of foster care litigation, because
it opened the doors to many new litigation theories that provided op-
portunities for foster children to bring successful actions.
B. Section 1983 as a Vehicle to Vindicate Substantive Rights of
Foster Children
Section 1983 derives from section one of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which provided a cause of action for deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. ' Since rights under federal statutory law (including the
Social Security Act) are enforceable under section 1983,"99 recent foster
care litigants have utilized section 1983 against states for non-
compliance with obligations under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.
2. "permanent foster care" must be eliminated as a category of perma-
nent plans considered appropriate;
3. case plans must include highly specific recommendations and timetables;
4. caseloads must be limited to no more than 20 cases per worker;
5. child welfare workers and supervisors must meet more stringent
qualifications;
6. extensive training programs must be provided child welfare workers and
supervisors;
7. detailed guidelines for enhancing childrens' opportunities for adoption
must be followed;
8. detailed computerized information and tracking system must be im-
plemented; and
9. citizen review boards must be found to monitor the progress of foster
children and have access to their case files.
575 F. Supp. at 354-64.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). This section states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
199. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In Maine, the respondents alleged
that the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Resources violated § 1983
of the United States Code by depriving the respondents of welfare benefits to which
they were entitled under the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982).
448 U.S. at 3. The Court held that a § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations
of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. See id. at 4 (citing Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535
(1974) (holding that "suits in federal courts under § 1983 are proper to secure
compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating
states")); see also Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 729 (1978); Var Lare v. Hurley,
421 U.S. 338 (1975); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 311 (1968).
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A case in point, Lynch v. Dukakis,'" heavily relied upon section
1983 as a mechanism to vindicate the violation of constitutional rights.
The class action was brought by all the children under the jurisdic-
tion of Massachusetts' foster family home care system, and their natural
parents and foster parents." ' The plaintiffs sought relief with respect
to the failure of the Department of Social Services to comply with
the requirements set forth in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.202
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a preliminary injunction 03 requiring the Department to take
various steps to effect compliance with the Act.204
On appeal "[a]ppellants contend[ed] that Congress intended ... sec-
tion 671(b), which authorizes the Secretary to withhold or reduce fed-
eral funding under Title IV-E when a state does not comply with fed-
eral law, to be the sole remedy for violations of Title IV-E, to the ex-
clusion of section 1983 actions." 20' The court, after considering
Supreme Court precedent and the legislative history, found that
"nothing in the language or structure of Title IV-E suggests that Con-
gress meant section 671(b) to be an exclusive remedy, and appellants
have shown us nothing in its legislative history or in the case law
that would lead us to a different conclusion. ' 206 Furthermore, the
court noted that although many state laws require state compliance
with federal statutory requirements, often the practice is to deprive
children of their federally guaranteed rights. In such cases of de fac-
to discrimination, the court ruled that section 1983 is available as
a remedy. 0 7 Accordingly, Senior Circuit Judge McGowan affirmed the
200. 719 F.2d 504 (lst Cir. 1983).
201. See id.
202. See id. The court in Lynch stated that actions taken by the Department of
Social Services constitute "actions taken under the color of state law." Id. at 511-12.
The phrase action taken under the color of state law has been defined as the "[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.... ." United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941) (cited with approval in Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945)).
203. For a discussion of the requirements of a preliminary injunction, see supra
note 147 and accompanying text.
204. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 514. The specific relief ordered by the district court in
granting the preliminary injunction provided that unless the Department of Social
Services was willing to forego federal funding for its foster care and child welfare
programs, it must: (I) reduce caseloads to no more than 20 per worker, or fewer
if necessary, to enable workers to meet their responsibilities, see id. at 506; (2) pro-
vide each child with a detailed case plan, see id.; (3) periodically review each child's
status in foster care, see id.; (4) assign each case, i.e., deliver the file to a specific
social worker within 24 hours of its receipt by the Department of Social Services.
See id.
205. See id. at 510.
206. Id. at 512.
207. See id. at 511; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on
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district court, holding that "to the extent that Title IV-E confers rights
on individuals, section 1983 is available to remedy violations of those
rights." 2 '
C. Common Law Negligence Suits for Vindication of
Foster Care Abuse
Attorneys have likewise brought common law negligence suits in
attempts to redress foster care abuses. In In re P.,209 the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the Jefferson County Department
for Human Resources in Kentucky, on behalf of a "brother and sister
who had drifted in foster care for eighteen months after a court had
terminated their ties to their parents." 3 0 The plaintiffs predicated their
action on common law negligence standards, and drew analogies to
statutes that impose an affirmative duty on parents to care for their
children.' ' The case resulted in a consent decree in which the County
officials agreed to develop permanency plans for all foster children
and to adhere to firm timetables for reviewing and carrying out the
plans.''
In Roberta Fields v. County of Alameda,2 3 a foster child (Roberta
Fields) received a large settlement from Alameda County for abuses
that she suffered during her long years in foster care."" Similarly,
her action was based on a negligence action supposedly symptomatic
of a general pattern of neglect by social workers."s In sum, common
law negligence cases can be successful for foster children, when courts
are willing to find that state officials have violated their duties of
care and supervision toward these needy children."',
other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)
(Supreme Court similarly recognized this discriminatory state practice and stated that
one purpose for enacting section 1983 "was to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice").
208. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 512.
209. In re P., No. 78J04583, slip op. (Ky. 1983) (cited in Morain, Making Foster
Care Work, 4 CAL. LAW. 24 (1984)).
210. Id.
211. For a complete discussion of parental duties under common law negligence
theories, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
907-09 (5th ed. 1984).
212. In re P., No. 78104583, slip op. (Ky. 1983) (cited in Morain, Making Foster
Care Work, 4 CAL. LAW. 24 (1984)).
213. Roberta Fields v. County of Alameda, No. C-81-4164, slip op. (N.D. Cal.
1984) (cited in Morain, Making Foster Care Work, 4 CAL. LAW. 24 (1984)).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Nevertheless, there is an obstacle to successful foster care suits against state
officials-the sovereign immunity defense. See supra notes 223-32 and accompany-
ing text.
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V. The Inadequacies of Current Litigation Strategies to
Remedy the Problem
It is evident, after surveying the current litigation strategies 2' ap-
plied by foster care plaintiffs, that these approaches have been suc-
cessful only to the extent that they have helped a limited number
of plaintiffs. Each of these strategies is inadequate because it fails
to correct the current problem: foster children increasingly being
discharged without adequate preparation and ending up homeless." '
First, the one case in which a court has taken adequate steps to
prevent the homelessness of discharged foster children, Palmer v.
Cuomo,"9 is a New York State case and consequently has no preceden-
tial weight for foster children in other states.
Second, although class action suits may result in consent decrees, 2 0
forcing state officials to comply with specific requirements, they are
problematic because they raise federalism issues by limiting a state's
choice of approaches for compliance with federal law.22 ' Furthermore,
a' "catch-22" arises when courts create broad and general consent
decrees in order to prevent trampling upon a state's prerogative in
structuring its own statutes. On the one hand, a vague outline of
requirements that a state must follow will protect against federalism
problems; on the other hand, it also permits the states to avoid making
drastic changes in their policies toward foster children. As a result,
consent decrees may result in a "slap on the state's hand," rather
than any constructive changes. In addition, states frequently take their
time determining how to accommodate their policies to the court's
orders. Therefore, while they prepare plans to comply with the re-
217. See supra notes 142-216 and accompanying text.
218. See Rimer, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
219. See Palmer v. Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1985, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1985), aff'd as modified, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986).
220. See supra notes 142-97 and accompanying text.
221. In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the Supreme Court set out the
appropriate remedy for violations of rights secured by federal spending. See id. The
Court stated that in such cases, the district court should announce what is necessary
to comply with the federal program, and then allow an appropriate period of time
for the state to decide whether it preferred to forego federal funds. See id. at 408.
If the state decides to retain funding it must propose a plan for achieving com-
pliance which would then be subject to court approval. Id. at 408-09. But see
Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 513 (1982) (court noted that these federalism issues
"do not raise concerns as troubling as a district court's 'managing [a mental institu-
tion] or deciding in the first instance, which patients should remain (in the mental
institution] and which should be removed' ") (quoting Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)).
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quired standards, foster children are growing up and moving onto the
streets.2'
Third, the eleventh amendment's sovereign immunity defense,223
which protects the states and state officials from suits by private
parties, is a sizable obstacle to successful section 1983 actions brought
by foster care plaintiffs."" For example, in Joseph A. v. New Mexico
Department of Human Services, the court held that the Department
and the individual defendants in their official capacities were immune
from a suit for damages.22
In addition to the "absolute immunity" 2 6 for states and state of-
ficials discussed above, foster care plaintiffs must also contend with
the "good faith defense" '227 that can be affirmatively pleaded by
government defendants. 2 ' The "good faith defense" is a qualified
immunity based on a recent case, Harlow v. Fitzgerald.229 In Harlow,
the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing
discretionary230 functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
222. Barbara L. Emmeroth, the research director of the Citizens Committee for
Children, spoke about New Y6rk City's foster care system: "The city has been fairly
responsive, but like anything else it takes too long .... And when you're talking
about a child's life, you can't wait. They grow up." Roberts, Court Ruling Hints
at Broader Impact, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, at B2, col. 3.
223. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI provides, in relevant part: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State
..... " ld.
224. The eleventh amendment applies not only to a federal suit by a citizen of
one state against another state, but also to a suit brought in federal court by a citizen
of the defendant state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890); accord Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (holding eleventh amendment bars retroac-
tive payment of benefits). The eleventh amendment also applies to suits against state
agencies or state officials whenever "the state is the real, substantial party in in-
terest .... Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
225. See Joseph A., 575 F. Supp. at 353.
226. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that
an absolute immunity applies to "officials whose special functions or constitutional
status requires complete protection from suit . . . ." 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
227. See Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 195 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985). In Jensen, a § 1983 action against state and county agencies on
behalf of foster children who died from brutal beatings by their foster parents, the
court held that the county employees were entitled to a good faith immunity because
the law was not clear whether these children had a constitutional right of affirmative
protection. 747 F.2d at 194-95.
228. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding burden on defen-
dant to plead good faith as an affirmative defense to § 1983 claim).
229. See Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
230. To determine what a discretionary function is, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895d (1979). The factors listed therein at comment f include:
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damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." ''
This good faith defense has a particularly strong impact on foster
care cases, because of the discretionary nature of the work. Even
though federal and state statutes set forth requirements that guide
government agencies in the creation and operation of foster care
systems, 3 ' an individualized determination concerning the care pro-
vided to a particular child is a subjective decision that often falls
within the discretionary category.
Fourth, in individual private negligence actions, sovereign immun-
ity defenses will similarly be problematic. 33 Furthermore, private ac-
tions are judicially uneconomical and are very expensive and time-con-
suming for the plaintiffs." 4 In short, litigation has proved inadequate;
this is a federal problem requiring a federal remedy-federal legisla-
tion."'
(I) The nature and importance of the function that the officer is
performing.
(2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion
by the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the court
on the conduct of a coordinate branch of government.
(3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the free
exercise of his discretion by the officer.
(4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on
the officer.(5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if
the action is taken.
(6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be
produced.
(7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other
forms of relief.
Id. comment f.
231. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
232. See supra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. But see National Bank of
S.D. v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982). In Leir, the court held that a suit brought
by a guardian on behalf of minors against social workers who were allegedly negligent
in their placement and supervision of the minors in a foster home was not barred
by sovereign immunity as an action against the state. Id. at 847-48. The court in
Leir noted that the duty performed by the social worker in the case, was ministerial
in nature and not discretionary, and thus the social workers were not protected by
sovereign immunity. Id. at 848-50; see Bartels v. Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429
N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding that the actions of county employees in fail-
ing to supervise foster child are ministerial in nature).
234. Cf. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 115 (1980) (discussing
time and expense saved when plaintiffs bring class actions).
235. See infra notes 236-86 and accompanying text.
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VI. Proposal: Stark-Moynihan Bill
This Note maintains that federal legislation is needed to remedy
the current problem of graduates of foster care programs entering
the ranks of the homeless.3 The legislation best suited to this goal
is H.R. 2810 and S. 1329 (the Stark-Moynihan bill).2 31 The Stark-
236. See supra notes 217-35 and accompanying text.
237. H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., I (June 19, 1985). The proposed bill reads
as follows:
To amend part E of title IV of the Social Security Act to make necessary
improvements in the foster care and adoption assistance program with the
objective of assuring that such program will more realistically and more
effectively meet the needs of the children involved, and for other purposes.
TITLE I-PROVISIONS RELATING
TO OLDER FOSTER CHILDREN
SEC. 101. ELIGIBILITY OF OLDER CHILDREN FOR FOSTER
CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS.
Section 472(a) [42 U.S.C. § 672(a)] of the Social Security Act is amended
by adding at the end thereof (after and below paragraph (4)) the follow-
ing new sentence: "In applying clause (2)(B) of section 406(a) [42 U.S.C.
§ 606(a)] for purposes of determining under this section whether a child
would meet the requirements of such section 406(a) (42 U.S.C. § 606(a)]
but for his removal from the home of a relative, the term 'twenty-one'
shall be substituted for the term 'nineteen' in such clause, and everything
before 'under' and after 'technical training') in such clause shall be
disregarded."
SEC. 102. TRANSITIONAL INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS
FOR OLDER FOSTER CHILDREN.
(a) IMPOSITION OF PLAN REQUIREMENT.-Section 471(a) (42
U.S.C. § 671(a)] of the Social Security Act is amended-(l) by striking
out "and" at the end of paragraph (16); (2) by striking out the period
at the end of paragraph (17) and inserting "in lieu thereof"; "and"; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: "(18) ef-
fective October 1, 1987, provides a transitional independent living pro-
gram for older foster children in accordance with section 477 [74 U.S.C.
§ 677]."
(b) DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM.-Part E of title IV of the Social
Security Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the follow-
ing new section:
"TRANSITIONAL INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS FOR
OLDER FOSTER CHILDREN
"SEC. 477.(a) 142 U.S.C. § 677] Each State may establish at any time
on or after the effective date of this section (and must establish no later
than October 1, 1987) a transitional independent living program for children
with respect to whom foster care maintenance payments are being made
by the State under this part and who have attained age 16, providing under
such program for the establishment for each such child of an individual-
ized transitional independent living plan (which shall be based on an in-
dividualized assessment of the child's need, set forth in writing, and in-
corporated into the child's case plan as described in section 475(1)) [42
U.S.C. § 675(1)] with the objective, during at least the last year in which
the child is eligible for such payments, of helping the child prepare to
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Moynihan bill originated as two identical bills, which were proposed
by Representative Fortney H. Stark (D. Cal.) of the House of
Representatives' Ways and Means Committee and Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan (D. N.Y.) of the United States Senate's Commit-
tee on Finance. "3' The Stark-Moynihan bill is designed to improve
the foster care and adoption assistance program, by attempting to
ensure that the program will more realistically and more effectively
meet the needs of the children involved.239 The two sections of the
bill that specifically address the problem of older foster children becom-
ing homeless, sections 101 and 102, will be the focus of discussion
in this Note.2""
Section 101 of the Stark-Moynihan bill amends section 606(a) of
the Social Security Act, which defines a dependent child.2 ' The Stark-
Moynihan bill redefines "dependent child" by raising the age limit
from eighteen to twenty-one when a foster care dependent is a stu-
dent in secondary school or vocational training school.2"2 A statutory
live an independent life and of otherwise aiding in the adjustments which
may be necessary in the child's transition to independent living.
"(b) The transitional independent living plan established for a child under
subsection (a)-"(l) may include training in daily living skills, budgeting,
the location and maintenance of housing, career planning, and such other
aspects of independent living as may be of potential difficulty for the child,
and may also include appropriate academic and vocational counseling and
such additional activities as the State, under regulations of the Secretary,
may determine to be appropriate and effective; and
"(2) shall be carried out in such manner, and in accordance with such
minimum requirements and specifications, as the Secretary shall prescribe.
"(c) The Secretary shall develop and disseminate to the States and to
providers of child welfare services, no later than April 1, 1986, informa-
tion and recommendations with respect to current and developing transi-
tional independent living programs and plans for older foster children which
might provide constructive guidance or serve as models for other States
in the establishment of their programs and plans under this section.
"(d) Expenses incurred by a State agency in establishing and conduct-
ing transitional independent living plans for older foster children under
this section shall be considered, for purposes of section 474(a)(3) [42 U.S.C.
§ 674(a)(3)], to be expenses described in subparagraph (B) of such section
which are necessary for the proper and efficient administration of the State
plan approved under this part."
Id. at 1-5.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.; see also infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982). For a discussion of the legislative intent underly-
ing the definition of a dependent child, see supra notes 53-64, 70 and accompanying
text.
242. H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 102, 103 (June 19, 1985).
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scheme that discharges foster care children at age twenty-one rather
than age eighteen is superior for a variety of reasons. First, an age
limit of twenty-one comports with recent case law. In Palmer v.
Cuomo," '4 the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held
that New York Social Services Law required "supervision" for foster
children until they reach age twenty-one."" And in Montgomery v.
Blum,2" the court in effect held that artificial age requirements must
be ignored when they will have a negative effect on the children they
are meant to help."'" In Montgomery,24 the dependent child applied
for benefits for the first time at age nineteen." The state denied the
benefits because she had never received benefits before age eighteen. " 9
The court held that the state's action was "clearly arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of discretion." 50
Second, an age limit of twenty-one comports with the legislative
history supporting the Social Security Act. For example, the Senate
Report No. 151711 to the 1964 Amendment to the Social Security
Act, which discusses the age limit for benefits to foster children,
demonstrates that Congress was opposed to an arbitrary age limit."
The Senate Report stated that "[tihe assumption that children are
no longer dependent upon attaining age [eighteen] is not valid as ap-
plied to children still attending school. Moreover, the present sharp cut-
off at age [eighteen] may have the effect of forcing just those children
to leave school who are most in need of a high school education or
vocational training if they are to become self-sufficient and stay off
the welfare rolls." '2 3
Furthermore, the fact that Congress has repeatedly amended and
experimented with the age limits2 4 shows that Congress is not com-
243. See 503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1986). For a complete discus-
sion of Palmer, see supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
244. See id.
245. See 112 Misc. 2d 190, 446 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1982).
246. See id. at 193, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See S. REP. No. 1517, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3925, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3925.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. The relevant statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 600-76 (1982), have been amended several
times. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1971) (discussing varying age
limitations that Congress has applied to foster children assistance programs). In 1939,
Congress amended the Social Security Act to extend aid to foster children between
the ages of sixteen and seventeen regularly attending school. See id. at 288. Congress
1986] 1005
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIV
mitted to any particular age. Rather, it reflects Congress' constant
struggle to choose an age that will best achieve the paramount goal of
foster care assistance-to protect the needy child.2"
In addition, an age limit of twenty-one is compatible with two sec-
tions of the Social Security Act that grant assistance to needy children
until they reach the age of twenty-one or twenty-two. These sections
are: (1) section 606(e)(1), 21' which provides for emergency assistance
to AFDC dependent children until age twenty-one; and (2) section
401,257 the Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance, which pro-
vides funds until age twenty-two.
These two sections, like foster care legislation, share the common
goal of preventing the destitution of needy children. 2 " Because of
this common goal, and because the Social Security Act should be com-
prehensive and consistent, the age limits for foster care payments and
the age requirements in the emergency assistance and the Old-Age Sur-
vivors Insurance and Disability sections should be harmonious.
Moreover, an age limit of twenty-one for foster care payments will
allow more time to prepare children for the transition into indepen-
dent living-particularly those who entered foster care at sixteen or
seventeen after already experiencing life on the streets.2 ' As a matter
of common sense, a three-year extension of foster care supervision
will allow an eighteen-year-old to gain experience and maturity which
will enhance his or her transition into independent living.
extended in 1956 benefits to all dependent foster children between the ages of sixteen
and seventeen. See id. In 1964, Congress again amended the Social Security Act
to extend benefits to foster children between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one
if they were in high school or vocational school. See id.
255. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968).
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(c)(1) (1982).
257. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(g) (1982).
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1982); id. § 401 (1982); see also Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282, 290 (1971) (discussing related purposes of Old Age Survivors and
Disability Insurance provisions and AFDC program).
259. To a certain extent, the proposed bill is based upon the findings of an in-
dependent study being performed by Helen Stone, director of the Institute for Quality
Child Welfare Services, a collaboration between Child Welfare League of America,
Inc., and the School of Social Services at Fordham University. In her testimony
before the Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Income Maintenance of the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means, Ms. Stone reported that foster children are appearing
"in runaway and homeless youth programs and other crisis intervention programs
in increasing numbers." See Stone, Hearings on H.R. 2810, supra note 126, at 2.
She attributes the increase "at least in part to a greater emphasis being placed on
providing foster family care as the 'least restrictive alternative' for status offenders,
[and] an increase in the number of dependent adolescents due to unmarried preg-
nancy, and the large number of youth who simply grew up in the system because
no permanent plans were made for them at an earlier age." Id. at 2-3.
260. See H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102, 3-5 (June 19, 1985).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1982).
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Section 102 of the Stark-Moynihan bill adds subection (18)260 to
section 671(a) of the Social Security Act. 2 6' Section 671(a) sets forth
the conditions with which states must comply in order to receive federal
funds;2 62 subsection (18) would mandate that states create inde-
pendent living programs in accord with specific standards articulated
in a second new section, section 677.263 Section 677 outlines programs
that state independent living programs must include, such as: (1) train-
ing in budgeting; (2) locating housing; and (3) career planning.1' Most
important, section 677 orders states to establish an individualized
transitional independent living plan for each child. "65 The bill's strategy
of focusing on the needs of each individual child is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent.26' In fact, the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth2 6 and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc. M  held statutes unconstitutional that failed to pro-
vide for an individualized determination of a child's maturity.269
It is true that Congress passed a diminished form of section 102
of the Stark-Moynihan bill when it enacted section 12307 (Indepen-
dent Living Initiatives) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1985.70 This bill, however, does not sufficiently remedy
the current problems of foster children. First, section 12307 requires
states to create independent living programs for foster children only
between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.2 ' As discussed above, in-
dependent living programs that end at age eighteen are unsatisfactory
because they prematurely terminate assistance to needy children.
Moreover, section 12307 is impotent: first, it merely suggests that
states may Include programs, such as individual case plans, instead
of mandating that states comply with the specific requirements.1 2 Even
262. See id.
263. See H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102, 3-5 (June 19, 1985). Although§ 677 of the Social SeCurity Act has been enacted by the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 12307, 100 Stat. 294 (1986),
the Stark-Moynihan bill proposed a different version of § 677, and for the purposes
of this Note, it will continue to be called § 677. See H.R. 2810, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 102, 3-5 (June 19, 1985). For a discussion of § 677 enacted by Pub.
L. No. 99272, see Infro notes 270.73 and accompanying text.
264. Se H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102, 3-5 (June 19, 1985).
265. See id.
266. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; infra notes 267-68 and accompa-
nying text.
267. See 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976) (striking down state law requiring minors to
obtain parental consent as prerequisite to abortion).
268. See 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983) (holding unconstitutional state abortion statute
that did not provide for individualized determination of child's maturity).
269. See 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
270. See Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 12307, 100 Stat. 294 (1985).
271. See id.
272. See id.
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worse, it qualifies state compliance as "subject to the availability of
funds." 2 ' Thus, section 12307 leaves too much to the discretion of
the states, and therefore allows the states to circumvent their respon-
sibilities to foster children while simultaneously perpetuating the
sovereign immunity obstacle.
Opponents of the Stark-Moynihan bill focus on the costs of the
proposed bill,' while ignoring the necessity of assisting older foster
children. Instead, opponents support two bills proposed by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services and favored by the Reagan ad-
ministration, H.R. 2894 and S. 1266, (the HHS bill). 2" The HHS
bill would put a permanent ceiling on Federal Foster Care expenditures,
thereby turning foster care into a block grant eliminating the individual
entitlement to care for poor children, without the assurance of adequate
federal funding for service alternatives. 7 6 In addition, the HHS bill
offers an incentive to the states to discharge foster children as quickly
as possible.27 ' This incentive consists of a $3,000 "bonus" for each
child that the states are able to discharge from foster care, when that
child has remained in the foster care system for more than two years.27 '
Critics of the HHS bill maintain that it is an incentive for states
to "dump long-term foster care children out of the system to earn
this bonus."2 '9 Indeed, the HHS bill is concerned primarily with a
reduced budget and not the welfare of foster children. 8" Such a posi-
273. See id.
274. Dorcas Hardy, Chief of Health & Human Services' Office of Human Develop-
ment Services, noted that H.R. 2810 would allot funds out of Title IV-E administrative
costs, and she emphasized that under current law, costs have "multiplied more than
4 times-from $32 million in [fiscal year] 1981 to $147 million in [fiscal year]
1984." Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act: Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Income Maintenance of the Comm.
on Finance, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1986) (testimony of Dorcas
Hardy, Chief of Health & Human Services' Office of Human Dev./Servs.) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329].
275. H.R. 2894, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); see also 11 ICw PROTECTION REPORT
3 (Sept. 27, 1985).
276. Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329, supra note 274, at 21-23. In 1981, the Reagan
administration first tried to fold foster care funds into a block grant for social ser-
vices to be given to each state, leaving the state to decide how to spend the money.
See D. MOYNIHAN, FAmILY AND NATION 49 (1986). Senator Moynihan notes: "In
principle this [block-grant] was good federalism, but welfare policies are an exception
to this principle. Some states had adoption assistance; others hadn't and never would
have had until the federal government subsidized it." Id. at 50. This measure passed
in the Senate but was dropped in the Conference Committee with the House. Id.
at 50-51.
277. Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329, supra note 274, at 13.
278. See id.
279. See Hearings on S. 1266, S. 1329, supra note 274, at 31.
280. The position advocated by Dorcas Hardy and the bill H.R. 2894 is consistent
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tion is hardly consistent with the legislative history or the case law.28 '
As the United States Supreme Court has unequivocally asserted, "[s]av-
ing money is not a proper justification for the denial of assistance
to the needy." '
Admittedly, the Stark-Moynihan bill is not free of problems. Overall,
however, the bill's weakness is that it does not go far enough to pro-
tect foster children.
First, the bill merely suggests possible programs, such as budgeting,
career planning, and locating housing, for a state to include in its
independent living programs." To be effective, the bill should com-
mand the states to implement specific programs. Second, the incen-
tive the bill provides-matching federal funds-is too weak. Instead,
the bill should emulate the 1986 Federal Highway Fund Act,2" ' which
revokes federal funding for state highways from any state that refuses
to raise its drinking age to twenty-one. 2" The penalty of losing federal
funds from another source of federal funding would create a much
more effective incentive.28 6
In sum, despite minor shortcomings, the Stark-Moynihan bill re-
with several recent Reagan administration actions. See Fuerbringer, Homeless Are
Not Duty of U.S., Reagan Aide Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1986, at A1S, col. I.
The Reagan administration in its 1978 budget proposed the elimination of $70 million
for the homeless that had been in the 1986 budget of the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency. See id. at col. 3. Moreover, the director of the Office of Management
and Budget, James C. Miller, in testimony before the House and Budget Committee
said, "we believe the homeless are not a federal responsibility but a state and local
responsibility." Id. at cols. 2-3. H.R. 2894 illustrates another example of the ad-
ministration's naive attitude about the causes of homelessness which was first ap-
parent in President Reagan's statement in January, 1984 when he thought most of
the homeless people sleeping on grates in cities were doing so by "choice." See id.
at col. 4.
281. See supra notes 52-73, 90-122 and accompanying text.
282. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (holding state statute pro-
hibiting welfare benefits to residents of less than one year violated equal protection).
283. See H.R. 2810, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 2-3 (June 19, 1985).
284. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-272, § 4101, 100 Stat. 112 (1986).
285. See id. at § 4104, 100 Stat. at 114.
286. For example, the results of the federal government's imposition of penalties
on states by taking state highway funds pledged to the states by the federal govern-
ment complied with the federal statute. Moreover, the federal government's indirect
effort to raise state minimum drinking ages has been very successful, because by
January of 1985, 24 states had enacted legislation making the minimum drinking
age 21. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1985, at 7. As of September, 1985, 13 more states enacted
laws raising the legal drinking age. See id. As of December, 1985, every state either
had a minimum drinking age of 21 or was changing the age to 21 during the next
year, except for Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, South
Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id.
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mains the best remedy for foster children who, upon automatic
discharge at age eighteen, become homeless.
VII. Conclusion
The current problem in the foster care system is that it allows states
to discharge eighteen-year-olds who are ill-prepared for independent
living. As a result, these foster children become homeless. Current
litigation strategies have failed to remedy the problem. The Stark-
Moynihan bill will help alleviate the syndrome of sending foster
children out of their homes and onto the streets.
Mari Brita Maloney
